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A model of the labor market is built where imperfect detection in case of
auditing induces underreporting of earnings. The introduction of the mini-
mum wage makes some workers increase compliance, boosting ￿scal revenues.
A spike at the minimum wage level appears in the distribution of earnings.
The model predicts a positive correlation between the size of the spike at
the minimum wage level and the size of the informal economy. Empirical
evidence supporting this prediction is presented.
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1 Introduction
What are the ￿scal implications of introducing or increasing the minimum
wage? How can we explain the very high spike at the minimum wage level ap-
pearing in the wage distribution of some countries? This paper contributes to
answering these questions by studying the e⁄ects of the interaction between
tax evasion and minimum wage legislation.
0I thank the Department of Economics at the Central European University, where part
of this research was conducted, for its hospitality. Comments and suggestions by John
Hassler, Peter Fredriksson, Gabor Kezdi, Laszlo Goerke, Ethan Kaplan and seminar and
conference participants at CEU, IIES, HAS-IE, Uppsala University, BICEPS, ENTER
2006, LoWER 2006, WPEG 2006 have been greatly helpful. Financial support by the Jan
Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse is gratefully acknowledged.
1A simple model of the labour market is built where underreporting of
earnings is made possible by imperfect detection of tax evasion. When au-
diting a ￿rm the tax authority may discover only a part of its true tax
liability. Even when ￿nes are imposed on risk neutral ￿rms and the prob-
ability of auditing is given, imperfect detection alone is able to generate an
internal solution to the tax evasion decision. This is due to the fact that
￿nes are imposed on the di⁄erence (if positive) between discovered income
and declared income.
The introduction of the minimum wage induces some worker-￿rm pairs
to increase compliance, while pushing others out of the formal labour market
into the black economy or into inactivity. The increase in compliance is due
to the fact that the minimum wage poses a constraint to reporting behavior,
as agents have to choose whether to report nothing or to report at least the
minimum wage. When faced with such a restriction agents may prefer to
increase their reporting to the minimum wage level than to decrease it to
zero. The overall e⁄ect when enforcement is not too e⁄ective is to unam-
bigously increase ￿scal revenues. The distribution of the ￿scal burden is also
altered. Moreover, an otherwise smooth distribution of declared earnings is
transformed by the introduction of the minimum wage into a distribution
presenting a spike at the minimum wage level.
The model also predicts a positive correlation between the size of the spike
at the minimum wage level and the size of the informal economy. Empirical
evidence supporting this prediction is presented.
The minimum wage is the subject of a rich literature and policy debate1.
Large e⁄orts have also been devoted to the theoretical and empirical study
of tax evasion and the shadow economy2. However, the aspects of the in-
teraction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion investigated in
this paper have, to the best of my knowledge, never been analysed before.
A World Bank study on labour markets in Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union (World Bank, 2005) notices how in several countries in the
region "disproportionately high shares of workers cluster on declared wages
at or just above the minimum wage (with evidence of additional undeclared
incomes above the minimum), creating incentives to sustain a high minimum
wage to sustain tax revenue" and calls for further research on this aspect of
1See Brown (1999) for a review.
2See Andreoni et al. (1998) or Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for surveys on tax evasion
and Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey on the shadow economy.
2minimum wage policy. This is indeed the aim of the paper.
The importance for policymakers of contrasting tax evasion and increas-
ing budget revenues by establishing lower bounds to the amount of taxes
and social security contributions a person in formal employment has to pay
is being stressed by two recent reforms in Bulgaria and Croatia. In Bulgaria
minimum wage is ￿xed by national level negotiations, but since the beginning
of 2003 employers have been required to pay social security contributions on
the basis of minimum social insurance thresholds, varying along economic
activity and occupational groups (Hristoskov, 2004, and Tomev, 2004.) In
Croatia, where the minimum wage is not prescribed by law, a minimum basis
for calculation of obligatory social security contributions has been established
in 2003 (Crnkovi· c-Pozai· c, 2004.) These reforms have introduced instruments
speci￿cally aimed at tackling the issue of underreporting, at least with re-
gards to social security contributions. In countries where such a reform has
not been conducted, it is the minimum wage that is playing the role.
The literature on tax evasion has been mainly focused on personal income
tax and on the compliance decision by an individual ￿lling the tax declara-
tion form. However, due to the tax withholding and information reporting
systems present in many countries, this is not an accurate description for the
case of employed labour. Indeed, the rate of non-compliance for wages and
salaries at the stage of ￿lling the tax declaration form is often negligible. For
instance, Klepper and Nagin (1989) report a mere 0.1% non-compliance for
wages and salaries in the US, lower than for any other income category. The
study of tax evasion by employed labour is however of particular interest as
￿scal imposition on labour in the form of social security contributions (SSC)
and personal income tax (PIT) represents the bulk of ￿scal revenues in many
countries3. A contribution of the paper is to present a tractable model of tax
evasion by employed labour.
The literature on minimum wage has been particularly concerned about
its impact on the distribution of earnings. A spike at the minimum wage level
has been observed in several instances (see for instance DiNardo et al., 1996,
Rama, 2001, Neumark et al. 2004, Dickens and Manning, 2004). Such a spike
has been de￿ned as a "puzzle" for several standard types of labour market
models (Brown, 1999) and as an "anomalous ￿nding from the standpoint
3In EU15 as a whole labour taxes contributed in 2002 around 50% of total tax receipts
(Eurostat, 2004), while in several Central and Eastern European countries social security
contributions alone represent more than a third of total tax revenues (UNECE, 2004.)
3of the standard model of the low wage labor market" (Card and Krueger,
1995, p. 152.) Proposed rationalizations include reductions in non-wage
compensation or increases in required e⁄ort to o⁄set a binding minimum
wage, ￿ atter earnings pro￿les, adjustments in the amounts of hours worked.
The model presented here proposes an alternative rationale for the observed
spike in the framework of a competitive model. The positive correlation
between the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the estimated
size of the informal economy in the data presented in section 5 suggests
that the mechanism analyzed in this paper indeed contributes to shape the
observed distribution of earnings in some countries.
The following section provide some evidence about the relevance of under-
reporting of earnings. In section 3 some of the related previous literature is
discussed. The model is introduced in the fourth section. First it is solved in
absence of a minimum wage, then the various e⁄ects of introducing the min-
imum wage are explored. Section 5 investigates empirically the relationship
between the size of the spike at minimum wage level and the informal econ-
omy. A section exploring the quantitative implications of the model through
a simple numerical exercise follows. Section 7 presents some extentions to
the basic model. The last section concludes.
2 The relevance of underreporting
Undeclared work is a serious issue in many countries. Reliable data on its
extension are di¢ cult to come by, but raw estimates indicate that the phe-
nomenon is relevant, particularly in transition and developing countries, but
also in some OECD countries (see Schneider and Enste, 2003, pp. 43-53.)
In a report for the European Commission about ￿undeclared work in an
enlarged union￿(Renooy et al., 2004) the authors stress how the practice
of paying ￿envelope wages￿ above the o¢ cially declared minimum ￿exists
in practically all of the Central and Eastern European countries￿ and in
particular in the less developed. For instance, ￿in Latvia, underreporting (not
non-reporting!) of income dominates all other forms of undeclared work￿ ,
while ￿in Bulgaria and Romania, it is also a well-known practice used in all
sectors of the economy.￿
According to the Lithuanian statistical o¢ ce (Statistics Lithuania, 2003)
￿economic entities in 2002 did not declare at least 23 per cent of wages and
salaries formally and informally paid to employees￿while ￿the number of non-
4registered employees is considered to reach 104 thousand￿(by comparison
total employment was 1.4 millions in 2002).
An OECD study of the Baltic countries (OECD, 2003) also reports as a
common practice the payment of supplements above the o¢ cially declared
wage and estimates that in Latvia and Lithuania 20% of private-sector em-
ployees earn more than what is o¢ cially reported4. An employers￿survey
puts the percentage of wage on which social insurance contributions are ac-
tually paid at 86% in Lithuania and at 91% in Latvia. In Bulgaria as of
March 2003, 22.6% of people working under an employment contract were
estimated to receive actual wages higher than those declared for tax and
social security purposes (Tomev, 2004.)
In a poll about wages "under the table" in Russia (Petrova, 2005) 11%
of employees reported to receive all of their income under the table, while
8% got part of it under the table. These practices are particularly serious in
large cities, where they involve 16% and 17% of employees respectively.
The phenomenon is not limited to CEE economies. An OECD study ￿nds
that, among OECD members, beside Hungary, also Mexico and South Korea
had "actual social security contribution receipts [...] about 30% short of what
could be expected on the basis of scheduled contribution rates and ceilings,
compared with total wages and salaries in national accounts which include
estimates of undeclared incomes", while Italy, Poland, Spain and Turkey5
had an estimated shortfall above 20% (OECD, 2004.)
3 Previous literature
The implications for tax evasion of the tax withholding system applied to
employees have been studied in a series of papers by Yaniv (1988, 1992, 1995,
1996, 1998, 1999.) Tax evasion stems from separate decisions by the employer
and the employee (Yaniv, 1988) or, more in line with the approach proposed
here, from a collaboration among the two (Yaniv, 1992.) In the latter article
evasion arises when a risk-neutral employer agrees to reduce the tax liability
4The Latvian Central Statistical O¢ ce publishes data on earnings under the heading
"Gross wage of employed excluding all kinds of irregular payments by kind of activity"
(italics added.)
5In Turkey ￿rms that belong to the formal sector are estimated to underreport 28% of
their wage bill and for around 50% of employees enrolled in SSK (Social Security Orga-
nization) wages reported by employers are at the minimum insurable level (World Bank,
2006.)
5of a risk-averse employee by underreporting her wage, in exchange for paying
a gross wage below the market rate. In case of detection, a ￿ne is imposed
on the employer and the employee has to pay due taxes. Under e¢ cient
bargaining and non-decreasing relative risk-aversion by the employee, the
contract curve is shown to have a slope such that a higher declared wage
corresponds to a higher paid wage. Moreover, with logarithmic utility, the tax
withholding system is shown to entail greater evasion than a self-declaration
system with the same enforcement parameters. Advanced tax payments are
also analysed using prospect theory (Yaniv, 1999). However, the papers by
Yaniv are mainly concerned with analyzing the e⁄ects of the tax witholding
system, while the e⁄ect of the minimum wage for evasion behaviour has not
been considered.
Fugazza and Jacques (2003) study the e⁄ect of the minimum wage in a
labour market where tax evasion takes the form of participation in the in-
formal sector. They develop a matching model where workers can search for
a job and ￿rms can post vacancies either in the formal or informal sector.
Workers di⁄er in the subjective cost of operating in the informal sector and
the total number of jobs is given. The authors determine the tightness of the
two labour markets and their relative size in terms of active workforce and
then study the e⁄ect of variations in labour market and ￿scal institutions.
The model have two di⁄erent interior equilibria, depending on whether the
instantaneous net return of a ￿lled job is higher in the regular or irregular
sector. In that framework the introduction of a minimum wage is interpreted
as an increase in the exogenously given wage in the formal sector and is found
to have an ambiguous e⁄ect on the relative size of the two labour markets
in both equilibria. On one hand, formal employment is more attractive for
workers. On the other hand, to induce ￿rms to post vacancies in the formal
sector the relative labour market tightness in the formal vis-￿-vis the informal
sector has to decrease, thus making search in the formal sector less attrac-
tive for workers. The e⁄ect on the government budget depends on which
equilibrium the economy is in. While Fugazza and Jacques address some of
the same issues dealt with in the present paper, the framework of analysis is
rather di⁄erent. In their paper, workers can either completely comply with
regulation or be outside of the legal labour market, and wages in the two
sectors are exogenously given.
The view that a worker can be involved in both informal and formal
activities is held by Cowell (1985). He studies a model where time can be
allocated among leisure, work in the formal sector, and work in the informal
6sector. The e⁄ects of ￿scal and enforcement parameters on the dimension
of the informal sector is investigated. The paper contrasts a self-declaration
tax system, where the exogenously given wage is identical in the two sectors
of activity, to a Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system, where wages may instead
di⁄er. The potential relevance of a discontinuity arising when a worker passes
from doing some legal work to being completely in the black economy is
stressed. As in the previous paper, wages in the two sectors are exogenously
given. Moreover, the implication for the wage distribution of the interaction
of tax evasion and minimum wage legislation is explored in none of the above
mentioned papers and, to the best of my knowledge, has not been previously
addressed in a formal model.
4 The model
The size of the population is exogenously given and normalized to 1. Every
individual has an exogenously given productivity yi , distributed in the pop-
ulation according to pdf g(y) and cdf G(y) on the support [y
ﬂ
; ￿ y], where y
ﬂ
￿ 0.
We assume that the labour market is competitive, each ￿rm employs one
worker, there is no capital, and that production is equal to the labour input.
Moreover, there is free entry of ￿rms, ￿rms can observe workers￿productivity,
and workers can move from one ￿rm to another at no cost.
Firms are risk-neutral and maximize pro￿ts ￿. In an environment without
tax evasion pro￿ts for a ￿rm employing a worker with productivity yi are
given by:
￿i = yi ￿ wi
where wi is the gross wage6. Firms have an obligation to withhold taxes
and social security contributions and transfer them to the authorities. Taxa-
tion is at the proportional rate t 2 (0;1). Workers￿(indirect) utility depends
on their net income, so that they maximize the net wage:
Ii = wi(1 ￿ t)
The wedge between the gross wage payed by the ￿rm and the net wage
received by the worker, twi, is paid to ￿scal authorities.
6No distinction is made between labour cost and gross wage and the two concepts
should be considered equivalent in the paper.
7Free entry of ￿rms implies that in equilibrium expected pro￿t are zero
and this in turn implies, in the full compliance case, that a worker with
productivity yi would receive a gross wage yi, from which ￿rm would deduct
taxes tyi leaving the worker a net wage (1 ￿ t)yi.
In this economy, however, it is possible to evade taxes and social security
contributions by not reporting to the authorities part or all of the workers￿
earnings. A ￿rm employing a worker with productivity yi has therefore to
decide how much of the worker￿ s product to declare to tax authorities, xi , and
how much to conceal, yi￿xi. If xi = yi, then the ￿rm is fully compliant with
regulations. If xi = 0, then the full product is hidden from the authorities and
the ￿rm-worker pair operates completely in the black economy. If xi 2 (0;yi),
then there is underreporting.
A worker-￿rm pair can thus operate in the formal economy, by declaring
a strictly positive income, or be completely in the black market, by declaring
nothing. A worker can also decide to be inactive. In this case income is
normalized to 0.
Tax authorities may inspect ￿rms to ￿nd out whether they comply with
￿scal regulation. Notice that ￿nes are imposed on ￿rm in case tax evasion
is detected. We assume that there is an exogenously given probability of an
audit being performed ￿ 2 [0;1].
However, the fact that an audit is performed does not imply that the
authority discovers for sure the true tax liability, but it may ￿nd evidence
to impute an income ^ yi 2 [0;yi], where yi is the true product. For instance,
Feinstein (1991) estimates that IRS examiners managed on average to detect
only half of the tax evasion in the forms they audited, while Erard (1997)
rejects the null hypothesis of perfect detection in his empirical investigation
of a model where detection can be either complete or null. For analytical
convenience, we assume that the detection technology is such that the prob-
ability of ￿nding an imputable product ^ yi is uniform over the interval [0;yi],
i.e. ^ yi s U[0;yi].
Given a declaration of xi and collected evidence of a true tax liability of
^ yi the tax authority imposes to the ￿rm, in case ^ yi > xi , the payment of
￿t(^ yi ￿ xi), consisting of taxes plus an additional ￿ne proportional to assessed
tax evasion, thus ￿ > 1. In case ^ yi ￿ xi the tax authority cannot prove any
tax evasion, so no ￿ne is imposed.
Given a true product yi and a reported one xi 2 [0;yi] the expected ￿ne




















Notice that a decrease in reported income, xi, does not increase the prob-
ability that any particular level of income is detected, as this probability is
given. However, it increases the probability of paying a ￿ne, as a ￿ne is im-
posed on the di⁄erence between detected and reported income, if positive. In
Appendix A we present a di⁄erent detection technology resulting in expected
￿nes equivalent to (1). Given the detection technology, the expected fraction
















i.e. a fraction corresponding to half the ratio of evaded income over true
product. The assumption is thus that it is relatively easy to get away with
tax-evasion.
In the economy there is a minimum monthly wage ￿ w, with universal
coverage. Workers cannot be legally employed at below the minimum wage,
in the meaning that their reported gross wage cannot be below the minimum.
The assumption in the model is that the minimum wage is ￿xed on
a monthly basis for full-time work and that no alternative working-time
arrangements are available. This simpli￿es the analysis and captures some
features characterizing Central and Eastern European labour markets. How-
ever, in section 7.1 the model is extended to the case where the minimum
wage is ￿xed on an hourly basis, labour supply can vary across workers and
underreporting can involve both hours of work and hourly wage.
Below we ￿rst determine the equilibrium wage and evasion in case of no
minimum wage, then with the minimum wage. Several implications of the
interaction between minimum wage and underreporting are also explored.
For convenience subscripts are suppressed where not necessary.
94.1 Equilibrium without minimum wage
For a ￿rm employing a worker with productivity y , declaring x , and paying
a gross wage w the possible realizations of pro￿ts are given by7:
￿ =
￿
y ￿ w with probability 1 ￿ ￿
y ￿ w ￿ f with probability ￿
where f , the expected ￿ne in case an audit is conducted, is given by (1).
Therefore, expected pro￿ts for the ￿rm are:
E￿ = y ￿ w ￿ ￿f (3)
substituting (1) into (3) we get:







The ￿rm chooses both w and x to maximize its pro￿ts.
The income I for a worker employed in a ￿rm paying a gross wage w and
declaring to ￿scal authorities x is given by:
I = w ￿ xt (5)
this expression captures the fact that taxes and social security contribu-
tions are deducted from the worker￿ s declared gross wage x, not from his true
gross wage w.
Free entry implies that ￿rms will compete by o⁄ering to workers the
package (w;x) that maximizes (5) until expected pro￿ts go to zero. Thus,
the wage equation is obtained by equalling expected pro￿ts (4) to zero:







the corresponding income for the worker is given by substituting (6) into
(5):






2 ￿ xt (7)
7Actually, when an audit is performed possible realizations of pro￿ts are a continuum,
due to the stochastic nature of the ￿ne. For expositional convenience the expected value
of the ￿ne is considered.
10and the solution to the reporting decision problem is obtained by maxi-









2 ￿ xt (8)








The second-order condition is always satis￿ed. The boundary condition
x ￿ y is always satis￿ed. Notice that full compliance (i.e. x = y) does
not take place unless ￿￿ ! +1 . In Appendix A it is shown that evasion
remains at all levels of income even with the probability of auditing depending
on reported income, i.e. ￿ = ￿(x). The condition x ￿ 0 is satis￿ed if and
only if ￿￿ ￿ 1. When enforcement is very weak, so that ￿￿ < 1, full evasion
will take place, i.e. x = 0.





To summarize, the solution to the reporting problem without minimum




(1 ￿ ￿)y if ￿ ￿ 1 case 1 - partial evasion
0 if ￿ > 1 case 2 - full evasion (9)
Thus, the model implies that, irrespective of the speci￿c level of produc-
tivity, ￿rms reveal a constant fraction of their production to ￿scal authorities.
As @￿
@￿ < 0 and @￿
@￿ < 0 , in an interior solution the fraction of product
that is evaded decreases as enforcement improves.




y(1 ￿ t) + 1




￿t) case 2 - full evasion (10)
The expected fraction of concealed production that is discovered in case
of auditing is, by substituting x = (1 ￿ ￿)y into (2), 1
2￿. Thus, for example,
in an economy where 30% of income is concealed, only 15% of evasion is
detected on average in case of auditing.
114.2 E⁄ects of introducing the minimum wage
In this section we study what are the e⁄ects of introducing a minimum wage
￿ w in the economy. We focus on the case where there is partial evasion, i.e.
￿ 2 (0;1) 8.
4.2.1 E⁄ects on the distribution










The only di⁄erence is in the choice set, that shrinks from [0;y] to f0g [
[￿ w;y].
The introduction of the minimum wage divides worker-￿rms pairs into
three categories:
1. High productivity: yi > ￿ w
1￿￿
2. Intermediate productivity: ￿ w ￿ yi ￿ ￿ w
1￿￿
3. Low productivity: yi < ￿ w
Worker-￿rm pairs characterized by high productivity would have declared
more than the minimum wage anyway, so they are una⁄ected by it. The
minimum wage is instead a binding constraint for worker-￿rm pairs that
would have declared less in its absence. We ￿rst analyze the case of low-
productivity workers.
8For this to be the case, we need ￿￿ > 1. By assumption ￿ > 1, but ￿, the probability
of being subject to an audit, may be low, so this condition may seem restrictive. Notice,
however, that in this model an audit is extremely ine⁄ective. As already mentioned if, for
instance, 30% of income is evaded, during an audit on average only 15% of the evaded
income is discovered. Thus, more than a full-￿ edged investigation, an audit should be
rather interpreted in the present set-up as a routine check by ￿scal authorities, thus hap-
pening much more frequently than a thorough inquiry. Also, notice that in the proposed
alternative setting for the auditing technology ￿ may be any positive number.
12Low productivity A worker with productivity below the minimum
wage, yi < ￿ w , can only work in the black market or be inactive. The possi-
bility of a worker paying back part of his wage to the ￿rm is thus excluded.
The main results are qualitatively una⁄ected by this modelling choice.
From (10) we get income in case of work in the black market, i.e. full
evasion:




Income in case of inactivity is assumed to be 0.
The labour market status is chosen by comparing income in the two cases,
giving the following condition:
Ibm > 0 , ￿ >
t
2
Then, if ￿ > t
2 workers with productivity below the minimum wage choose
to work in the black market, as the expected return is positive, otherwise they
withdraw from the labour market. Thus, the prediction is that, for a given
tax rate, in economies where enforcement is quite e⁄ective the minimum
wage pushes workers into inactivity, and therefore has a negative impact on
e¢ ciency, as productive labour stays idle. Instead, in economies with not
very e⁄ective enforcement the minimum wage hasn￿ t a negative impact on
e¢ ciency as workers continue to produce in the black market.
Intermediate productivity The possibility to declare the minimum
wage and thus participate in the formal labour market is instead available
for worker-￿rm pairs whose optimal declaration in case of no minimum wage
regulation is less than ￿ w, but with productivity above ￿ w, i.e.




Income in case of declaring ￿ w is given by subsituting x = ￿ w in (7):





(yi ￿ ￿ w)
2 (13)
Declaring a wage higher than the minimum is never optimal. Moreover,
as Imw > 0 for productivities satisfying (12), these workers will never go into
inactivity. The choice is thus between declaring the minimum wage or work
13in the black market and declare 0. The comparison between income in case
of declaring the minimum wage and income in the black market as given by
(11) gives the following condition:
Imw ￿ Ibm , yi ￿
1
2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ w ￿ ymw (14)
As the choice between employment at the minimum wage and employ-
ment in the black market is relevant only for workers satisfying (12) to de-
termine the behaviour once a minimum wage is introduced it is necessary to
position ymw in the interval [￿ w; ￿ w
1￿￿]:
￿ ymw < ￿ w
1￿￿ , 1
2(1￿￿) ￿ w < ￿ w
1￿￿ , this condition is always satis￿ed.
￿ ymw > ￿ w , 1
2(1￿￿) ￿ w > ￿ w , ￿ > 1
2
We then have two possible states:
1. ￿ > 1
2: then ymw 2 (￿ w; ￿ w
1￿￿) i.e. some of the workers a⁄ected by
the minimum wage and with productivity higher than the minimum
wage prefer to decrease evasion and declare the minimum, while others
prefer to go into the black market. For this to be the case the degree
of underreporting has to be very high. While this may be the case for
some economies, we consider the other case to be more relevant.
2. ￿ ￿ 1
2: then ymw ￿ ￿ w i.e. all workers a⁄ected by the minimum wage
and with productivity higher than the minimum wage prefer to increase
compliance and declare the minimum.
Thus, the behaviour of workers with intermediate productivity is charac-





2 ) declare ￿ w
￿ > 1
2 if yi s.t
(
￿ w ￿ yi < 1
2(1￿￿) ￿ w ) declare 0
1
2(1￿￿) ￿ w ￿ yi < ￿ w
1￿￿ ) declare ￿ w
The introduction of the minimum wage restricts the choice set for declared
earnings. Some, possibly all, worker-￿rm pairs prefer to increase compliance
by declaring the minimum wage and paying the corresponding taxes rather
than decrease it to zero by declaring nothing.
The results are summarized in proposition below.
14Proposition 1 The introduction of the minimum wage in an economy with
underreporting of earnings induces some, possibly all, workers whose produc-
tivity is above the minimum wage, but who would have declared less if there
was no minimum wage, to increase compliance by increasing their declared
earnings to the minimum wage level. Workers with higher productivity are
una⁄ected. Workers with productivity below the minimum wage work in the
black market if enforcement is not too e⁄ective, otherwise they withdraw from
the labour force.







(1 ￿ ￿) < x < ￿ y(1 ￿ ￿)
0 otherwise
after the introduction of the minimum wage it is given by:
gmw(x) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :









2;1￿￿g gx(x)dx if x = ￿ w





> > > > > <
> > > > > :










2(1￿￿);1g g(y)dy if x = ￿ w
g( x
(1￿￿)) if ￿ w < x ￿ ￿ y(1 ￿ ￿)
0 otherwise
Thus, a "smooth" distribution of productivity is associated with a "smooth"
distribution of declared earnings without a minimum wage. However, with
the introduction of the minimum wage, two spikes appear at the minimum
wage level and at zero. We can thus state the following:
Proposition 2 In a perfectly competitive labour market with underreporting
of earnings a spike at the minimum wage level appears in the distribution of
declared earnings.
154.2.2 E⁄ects on ￿scal quantities
The minimum wage divides worker-￿rm pairs into three categories: those
declaring nothing, those declaring the minimum wage, and the una⁄ected.
Here we ￿rst determine payments to ￿scal authorities for each category.
Then, we use the analysis of the distribution of declared earnings done above
to ￿nd out the e⁄ects of the minimum wage on ￿scal revenues.
Payments to ￿scal authorities Total payments, P, to the ￿scal author-
ities include taxes, T , and expected ￿nes, F. For worker-￿rm pairs not
a⁄ected by the minimum wage these quantities are:




% T1 = (1 ￿ ￿)ty
& F1 = ￿
2ty
Underreporting gives to worker-￿rm pairs with relatively high productiv-
ity the opportunity to reduce the "e⁄ective"9 tax rate by a factor ￿
2.
For worker-￿rm pair declaring the minimum wage ￿scal payments are
given by:
P2 = t￿ w + t
1
2￿
(y ￿ ￿ w)2
y
% T2 = t￿ w




The remaining category is represented by worker-￿rm pairs that are either
in the black economy (when ￿ ￿ t
2) or do not participate to the labour market
(when ￿ < t
2).
For workers in the black market ￿nes are the only type of payment, so:




Workers who withdraw from the labour market do not contribute to public
￿nances, so:







y in the relevant intervals10. Expected pay-
ments as a portion of income are the highest for worker-￿rm pairs in the








y , y ￿ w
2(1￿￿). As only workers with
productivity yi ￿ max( ￿ w; ￿ w




16black economy, the lowest for worker-￿rm pairs not a⁄ected by the minimum
wage. Thus, considering expected total payments, it is possible to state the
following:
Proposition 3 The interaction of minimum wage and underreporting trans-
forms a nominally neutral tax system into a regressive one.
E⁄ects of the minimum wage on revenues The way the working pop-
ulation splits into the three categories analyzed above has been established in
section 4.2.1. Here, to establish the e⁄ect of the minimum wage on revenues,
we analyze the "high underreporting" case, ￿ ￿ t
2, and the "low underre-
porting" case, ￿ < t
2, separately.
High underreporting When ￿ ￿ t
2 total revenues R are given by:
R =









max( ￿ w; ￿ w
2(1￿a))
[t￿ w + t
1
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The e⁄ects of increasing the minimum wage on total revenues depends
on whether ￿ 7 1
2. In case ￿ > 1
2 a worker with productivity equal to the
minimum wage prefers being employed in the black market than declaring











(y ￿ ￿ w)
y
]tg(y)dy
As [1 ￿ 1
￿
(y￿ ￿ w)
y ] > 0 , y < ￿ w
1￿a , then @R
@ ￿ w > 0. The variation is due to
higher payments by workers a⁄ected by minimum wage.
In case ￿ ￿ 1
2 a worker with productivity equal to the minimum wage
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]tg(y)dy
As [1 ￿ 1
￿
(y￿ ￿ w)
y ] > 0 , y < ￿ w
(1￿￿) and 1
2￿ ￿ 1 > 0 , ￿ < 1
2 , then @R
@ ￿ w > 0.
In this case there is an additional term, representing the e⁄ect of pushing
into the black market worker-￿rm pairs previously in the o¢ cial economy.
Low underreporting When ￿ < t
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]tg(y)dy
The ￿rst term represents the loss due to the withdrawal of workers from
the labour market. In this case the net e⁄ect of an increase in the minimum
wage depends on the shape of the distribution.
We can then state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When underreporting is high, revenues increase with the
minimum wage, i.e. @R
@ ￿ w ￿ 0. When underreporting is low the e⁄ect of
increasing the minimum wage on revenues depends on the productivity dis-
tribution.
The intuition is straightforward: maximization of workers￿net income is
equivalent to minimization of transfers to the government. Choice is limited
to the possible declaration space f0g [ [￿ w;+1). Increasing the minimum
wage shrinks the possible declaration space, so that the newly chosen com-
pliance after the increase in the minimum wage cannot make workers better
18o⁄. When the increase in the minimum wage does not have a negative impact
on production, i.e. it does not "shrink the pie", this implies that the govern-
ment cannot be made worse o⁄, i.e. revenues cannot decrease. This can be
counterbalanced by a decrease in revenues due to reduced total production
when an increase in the minimum wage pushes low productivity workers out
of the labour market.
This implies that countries where underreporting is serious because of
limited enforcement capacity can use the minimum wage to boost ￿scal rev-
enues, without having to worry too much about the impact on e¢ ciency11.
As enforcement improves the minimum wage becomes a less e⁄ective ￿scal
instrument and e¢ ciency issues become more prominent. However, equity is-
sues are also at stake, as the minimum wage increases revenues by extracting
more payments from low productivity workers.
In Bulgaria, for instance, in 2003 social security contributions payments
increased by almost 20% in 2003 "[a]s a result from the registration of the
labor contracts and the introduction of the minimum insurance income upon
principal economic activities and quali￿cation groups of professions, as well
as from the improved economic situation" (NSSI).
4.3 The link between the size of the underground econ-
omy and the spike at the minimum wage
Both the size of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the
underground economy relative to the economy as a whole are determined by
the interplay of the productivity distribution, the ￿scal enforcement para-
meters as summarized by ￿, and the minimum wage, ￿ w. In this section we
study the link between the size of the underground economy and the size of
the spike.
The spike at the minimum wage The size of the spike at the minimum





2(1￿￿) ￿ w; ￿ w)
g(y)dy
11The assumption is that productivity is the same in the formal and informal sectors.
See section 7.3.1 for a discussion on this issue.
19A decrease in enforcement parameters initially increases unambigously
the size of the spike, but as the process goes on the e⁄ect depends on the











1￿a) ￿ ￿ w
2(1￿￿)2g( ￿ w
2(1￿a)) if 1
2 < ￿ < 1
A decrease in enforcement parameters induces to declare the minimum
wage workers previously declaring more, increasing the size of the spike. If
enforcement is weak enough, however, some workers previously declaring the
minimum wage prefer to go into the black economy, reducing the size of the
spike. The condition for the size of the spike to increase as enforcement
parameters decrease in this case is:
1
2 < ￿ < 1 ) @S




Assuming that the distribution of productivity is single peaked, if the
minimum wage is binding for workers with productivity lower than the mode,
then the condition is satis￿ed. As S is continuous the eventual switch of the
economy from ￿ ￿ 1
2 to ￿ > 1
2 as ￿ increases is not an issue.
The e⁄ect on the size of the spike of an increase of the minimum wage











2(1￿￿)g(￿ w) if 1
2 < ￿ < 1
As ￿ w increases some workers previously declaring the minimum wage are
pushed out of the formal labour market, thus decreasing the size of the spike,
while some previously declaring more declare the minimum wage, increasing
the size of the spike.
The conditions for the size of the spike to increase as the minimum wage
increases are in this case:
￿
0 < ￿ ￿ 1
2 ) @S
@ ￿ w > 0 , g( ￿ w
1￿a) > (1 ￿ a)g(￿ w)
1
2 < ￿ < 1 ) @S
@ ￿ w > 0 , g( ￿ w
1￿a) > 1
2g(￿ w)
Also in this case the conditions are satis￿ed if the minimum wage is bind-
ing for workers with productivity lower than the mode and the distribution
of productivity is single peaked.12
12The analysis can also be conducted in terms of the size of the spike relative to the size
20The informal economy To investigate the impact of ￿ and ￿ w on the size
of the informal economy it is necessary to distinguish between the high and
low underreporting cases.
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yg(y)dy the derivatives of U, U
Y , U
Y ￿U (size of informal economy
relative to formal economy) all have the same sign, so we focus only on the
e⁄ects of ￿ and ￿ w on U.
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yg(y)dy > 0 if 1
2 < ￿ < 1
This is due to the fact that workers una⁄ected by the minimum wage
evade more. Moreover, when enforcement is already low, i.e. 1
2 < ￿ < 1, some




2(1￿￿) ￿ w; ￿ w)
g(y)dy
for ￿ > 1
2 a marginal increase in ￿ decreases the size of the o¢ cially employed workforce,
so the condition for S
L to increase with ￿ is looser than the one for S.
(
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the same is true w.r.t. ￿ w:
(
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1
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L
@ ￿ w > 0 , g( ￿ w
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2g( ￿ w)(1 ￿ S
L)
21workers previously declaring the minimum wage go into the black economy.
As U is continous the eventual switch of the economy from ￿ ￿ 1
2 to ￿ > 1
2
as ￿ increases is not an issue.
The e⁄ect of an increase in the minimum wage on the size of the informal
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2
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An increase in the minimum wage pushes some workers previously declar-
ing the minimum wage into the black economy, thus increasing informality,
but also forces workers continuing to declare the minimum to declare more of
their true income, thus reducing informality. Which e⁄ect prevails depends
on the shape of the distribution.
Low underreporting When 0 < ￿ < t
2 the size of the underground










The derivative w.r.t. ￿ is the same as in the high underreporting case,
but, as it is evident by comparing (15) with (16), there is a discontinuity in
the size of the informal economy at ￿ = t
2. When enforcement parameters
increases (i.e. ￿ decreases) so that there is a switch in the economy from the
high underreporting status to the low underreporting status, the size of the
informal economy drops discretely as workers previously in the black market
withdraw from the labour market. This jump goes in the same direction as
the derivative, so that we can state that the size of the informal economy
always decreases as enforcement parameters increase.
In the low underreporting case the size of the economy for a given distri-




@ ￿ w = ￿ ￿ wg(￿ w) < 0. As the minimum wage increases, workers with pro-
ductivity below the minimum wage withdraw from the labour market into
non-activity, lowering total production.
Given the sign of @U
@ ￿ w, the sign of the derivative of U
Y w.r.t. ￿ w is given by
the sign of @U
@ ￿ wY ￿ @Y
@ ￿ wU = @U
@ ￿ wY + ￿ wg(￿ w)U. The derivatives of U
Y and U
Y ￿U
(size of informal economy relative to formal economy) have the same sign.
22In case of low underreporting @U






) ￿ G(￿ w)] < 0
An increase in the minimum wage decreases the absolute size of the in-
formal economy. When workers with productivity lower than the minimum
wage withdraw from the labour market, an increase in the minimum wage has
the only e⁄ect to increase compliance by active workers, thus shrinking the
size of the informal economy. However, in this case the economy as a whole
also shrinks. The sign of the derivative of the relative size of the informal




)=@ ￿ w] = sign[￿[G(
￿ w
1 ￿ a
) ￿ G(￿ w)]Y + ￿ wg(￿ w)U]
which depends on the shape of the productivity distribution.
Given the analysis above, it is possible to state the following proposition:
Proposition 5 1. The size of the informal economy increases as enforce-
ment decreases.
2. The e⁄ect of an increase in the minimum wage on the size of the in-
formal economy relative to the formal economy is ambigous.
3. Assuming that the distribution of productivity is single peaked, a min-
imum wage binding for workers with productivity lower than the mode
is a su¢ cient condition for the size of the spike at the minimum wage
level to increase as enforcement decreases and as the minimum wage
increases.
4. Provided that enforcement is not very weak the size of the spike in-
creases as enforcement decreases.
Thus, if enforcement is not very weak or given a single peaked distri-
bution of productivity and a not too high minimum wage, an increase in
￿ increases both the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the
informal economy, inducing a positive correlation between the two. Such a
positive correlation is documented in the following section.
235 The link between informal economy and
spike
The model predicts that the enforcement parameters (as summarized by ￿)
should induce a positive correlation between the spike at the minimum wage
level and the size of the informal economy relative to the formal economy.
In this section some supporting evidence is presented.
The two ￿gures below present the relationship of the spike at the min-
imum wage13 with the size of the informal economy relative to the formal
economy14 and ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage15. The coun-
try included are all the countries for which Eurostat reports data on the
minimum wage and Schneider reports estimates of the informal economy.
The sample includes 16 European countries and the US. Ten of the Euro-
pean countries are Central and Eastern European, where statutory minimum
wage arrangements are common.
13Proportion of full-time employees with earnings on the monthly minimum wage
(source: Eurostat). Notice that the data collected by Eurostat are obtained from ad-
ministrative sources. For data point indicated with a triangle the de￿nition is di⁄erent:
part-time workers are included (France, Spain), minimum wage is ￿xed on an hourly base
(France, Ireland, UK, USA), earnings below the minimum wage are also included (UK,
USA). See Eurostat (2004) for details.
14Informal economy as % of o¢ cial GDP (source: Schneider 2005). A short description
of the method used to estimate the size of the informal economy is given in Appendix B
(see Schneider, 2005, for details).
15Minimum monthly wage as a proportion of average monthly earnings in industry and
services (source: Eurostat). In what follows this is indicated as the Kaitz index. For
France the ￿gure has been calculated by the author dividing the hourly gross wage by the
average gross hourly wage for a full-time employee in industry, trade and services (data
source: INSEE.)
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Sources: informal economy: Schneider (2005); spike: Eurostat
A positive correlation clearly appears between the size of the spike at the
minimum wage level and the estimated size of the informal economy. Instead
there appear to be no clear relationship between the size of the spike and a
measure of how "biting" the minimum wage is in the wage distribution.
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These ￿ndings are con￿rmed by regressing the size of the spike on the size
of the informal economy and the Kaitz index. The former is signi￿cant, while
25the latter is not. Therefore, we can conclude that the positive relationship
between the spike and the informal economy is not driven by the minimum
wage. The model suggests that this relationship is instead driven by their
common dependance on enforcement parameters.
The regression implies that a 1% increase in the size of the informal
economy is associated with a 0.28% increase in the share of employees earning
the minimum wage.
Table 1: Regression results
Variable Coe¢ cient (Std. Err.)
Informal 0.279￿ (0.113)





Signi￿cance levels : y : 10% ￿ : 5% ￿￿ : 1%
6 A numerical exercise
In this section the quantitative properties of the model are explored.
Worker￿ s productivity is assumed to be distributed across 37 categories
in the range 1-10, with the distance between adjacent productivity categories
being 0.25. In the baseline scenario, the distribution of the workforce across
the di⁄erent categories is generated by normalizing the corresponding values
of a lognormal with parameters (1.5; 0.6). Tax and social security contribu-
tions are assumed to be equivalent to 30% and enforcement parameters are
such that without a minimum wage all agents evade 20% of their income, i.e.
￿ = 0:2. The minimum wage is assumed to be equal to the income declared
by the 6th productivity category, i.e. 1.8.











Distribution of declared earnings
The ￿gure shows the distribution of declared earnings among the o¢ cial
workforce before and after the introduction of the minimum wage. Without
the minimum wage (dashed line), declared earnings are in the range 0.8-8,
as 20% of product is evaded.
With the introduction of the minimum wage the distribution of declared
earnings (dots) changes. The minimum wage creates two spikes, at the min-
imum wage level and at zero. As the minimum wage reduces the size of the
o¢ cial workforce by truncating it from below, the distribution of declared
earnings is shifted upward above the minimum wage. Notice that in the
￿gure the spike at the minimum wage is the percentage of o¢ cial workforce
declaring the minimum wage. Instead, the spike at zero is the percentage of
the population not taking part to the o¢ cial labour market.
The table reports the size of the two spikes. Other indicators are also
calculated. In the model developed in this paper, the minimum wage is
assumed to apply to the workforce as a whole, thus the Kaitz index is simply
the minimum wage divided by the average declared wage. The percentage
increase in total ￿scal revenues (taxes and ￿nes) due to the introduction of a
minimum wage is also calculated. Finally, the size of the informal economy as
a percentage of the formal economy is presented, a measure that is consistent
with the estimates of the informal economy reported in Appendix B. In the
baseline scenario, without a minimum wage the informal economy would be







8.6 7.7 46.5 4.52 28
11.5 4.6 47.3 1.41 44
15.3 11.4 55.2 7.58 29.4
18.7 7.7 56.2 2.76 44.6
10.7 14.3 46.2 8.33 30.7
Scenario 3 - High minimum wage
μ=1.5 σ=0.6 α=0.2 mw=2.2
5: size of the informal economy as percentage of official economy
4: percentage change in total fiscal revenues due to the introduction of the minimum wage
Scenario 4 - High evasion, high minimum wage
μ=1.5 σ=0.6 α=0.3 mw=1.9259
1: as percentage of workforce in formal employment
2: as percentage of total population
3: minimum wage over average declared wage
Scenario 5 - Spread-out distribution
μ=1.5 σ=0.8 α=0.2 mw=1.8
Scenario 2 - High evasion
Scenario 1 - Baseline
μ=1.5 σ=0.6 α=0.2 mw=1.8
μ=1.5 σ=0.6 α=0.3 mw=1.575
minimum wage, the informal economy is equivalent to 28% of the formal
economy.
Four other scenarios are explored. In the "high evasion" scenario, en-
forcement is assumed to be weaker, so that 30% of income would be evaded
without a minimum wage constraint, i.e. ￿ = 0:3. The minimum wage re-
mains equivalent to the income declared by the 6th productivity category16.
The portion of the population a⁄ected by the minimum wage is the same as
in the baseline scenario, as only a reshu› e between workers declaring zero
and workers declaring the minimum wage takes place17. As established by
Proposition 4, the size of the spike at the minimum wage level increases,
together with the size of the informal economy.
In the "high minimum wage" scenario the minimum wage is assumed to
be equivalent to the income declared by the 8th productivity category, i.e.
2. In this case the minimum wage bites deeper into the wage distribution.
16Due to the increase in evasion, though, the actual level of the minimum wage is lower
than in the baseline scenario.
17Notice that the size the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the spike at
zero do not add up to the same number in scenarios 1 and 2 and in scenarios 3 and 4 only
because the reported spike at the minimum wage level is expressed as percentage of the
o¢ cial workforce, while the spike at zero as percentage of total population.
28As established by Proposition 4 the size of the spike at the minimum wage
level increases. The signi￿cance from a ￿scal point of view is also increased
compared to the baseline scenario, as established by Proposition 4.
The "high evasion, high minimum wage" scenario combines the previous
two variations. In this case, both the spike at the minimum wage level and
the size of the informal economy reach very high levels.
In the last scenario the distribution generating the frequencies is changed,
in particular the standard deviation parameter is increased to 0.8. The re-
sulting sizeable change in some of the indicators points to the fact that the
quantitative implications of the model are sensitive to the assumption about
the underlying distribution of productivity. However, these simple numerical
simulations show that the model is able to match the very high spike at the
minimum wage observed in some countries and that the ￿scal implications
of imposing a minimum wage can be sizeable, even if only people with the
lowest productivity are a⁄ected.
7 Extentions and discussion
In this section the robustness of the mechanism giving rise to a spike at the
minimum wage level is discussed and some extentions are proposed.
7.1 Working time
A minimum wage ￿xed on an hourly basis in an environment in which ￿rms
could declare the amount of hours worked with full ￿ exibility and no risk of
detection in case of underreporting would pose an extremely loose constraint
on reporting behavior. However, the minimum wage can still play its role
against underreporting of earnings if there are legislative constraints on the
amount of hours that can be reported or incentives not to declare a minimal
amount of hours18 or if misreporting hours of work can also be detected and
punished.
In this section we consider the latter case.
18According to Eurostat data from LFS the share of part-timers in Central and Eastern
European countries is generally low, at around 7% of employees. More interestingly,
according to the Hungarian UI Exit to Job Survey 64.7% of the low-wage UI recipients
who found a job in April 2001 received a ￿xed salary, 33.8% were paid an hourly wage and
only 1.5% concluded a business contract with the employer (Kertesi and Kollo, 2003.)
29Suppose a worker with hourly productivity yi supplies inelastically hi
hours of work per period. However, the worker-￿rm pair can choose to report
product per hour xi 2 [0;yi] and hours of work ￿i 2 [0;hi].
The audit and detection technologies are exactly the same in the two
dimensions. In case of audit the tax authorities manage to impute ^ xi 2 [0;yi]
and ^ ￿i 2 [0;hi]. The probabilities of detection are assumed to be distributed
uniformly over the relevant intervals, so that g^ xi(^ xi) = 1
yi and g^ ￿i(^ ￿i) = 1
hi,
and, for analytical convenience, they are assumed to be independent. The
corresponding c.d.f. are indicated as G^ xi and G^ ￿i.
The imposed ￿ne, fi, depends on the detected and declared hours of work
and product per hour. In particular, it is possible to distinguish four cases:
1. ^ xi < xi and ^ ￿i < ￿i ) fi = 0
2. ^ xi < xi and ^ ￿i > ￿i ) fi = t￿(^ ￿i ￿ ￿i)xi
3. ^ xi > xi and ^ ￿i < ￿i ) fi = t￿(^ xi ￿ xi)￿i
4. ^ xi > xi and ^ ￿i > ￿i ) fi = t￿(^ xi^ ￿i ￿ xi￿i)
In case 2 and 3 underreporting is discovered in one dimension only and the
￿ne is imposed on the assessed underreporting in that dimension multiplied
by the declared value on the other dimension.
Thus, given a declaration (xi;￿i) the expected ￿ne is given by (subscript
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Where g(^ x;^ ￿) = g^ x(^ x)g^ ￿(^ ￿). Given the hypothesis on the distributions,

















In what follows the equilibria with and without the minimum wage are
characterized.
307.1.1 Equilibrium without minimum wage
In the formulation proposed here income is given by:
I = yh ￿ x￿t ￿ ￿f (18)
Where f is given by (17.) Going through the same type of steps as in the
main model, the equivalent to (8) is given by:
max
x2[0;y];￿2[0;h]





























Where ￿ = 1
￿￿. To have an interior solution it is necessary that ￿ < 1
2,
otherwise full evasion in both dimensions takes place. In what follows it is
assumed that ￿ < 1
2, i.e. enforcement is strong enough to avoid full evasion.
The income corresponding to reporting (x￿;￿￿) is:
I
￿ = yh(1 ￿ t) + ￿yht (20)














so that the function is locally concave at (x￿;￿￿). However, the income
function is not globally concave. The ￿gure below gives an example of how










30 10 10 0
300
31y = 10;h = 40;￿ = 0:33;t = 0:4
To establish whether (x￿;￿￿) is indeed the global maximum point it is
necessary to check the value of the function along the boundaries.
Full evasion in one dimension First we analyze the boundaries within
the axes.
1 . Substituting x = 0 in (18), we get Ijx=0 = yh ￿ t
4￿yh (h2 + ￿2)y2 ,
that is maximized for ￿ = 0;
2. Substituting ￿ = 0 in (18), we get Ij￿=0 = yh ￿ t
4￿yh(y2 + x2)h2 , that
is maximized for x = 0
Thus, when there is total evasion in one dimension, then it is optimal
to have total evasion in the other dimension as well. A positive declaration
would only represent a lower bound on the ￿ne to be paid. Therefore, we
need to compare I￿ given by (20) with the income corresponding to total
evasion given by substituting x = 0;￿ = 0 in (18):
I
￿




For ￿ < 1
2 we always have that I￿ > I￿
bm.
Full compliance in one dimension This case is parallel to the case
analyzed in the main model, where indeed it is assumed that there is full
reporting of the amount of hours worked.
3. In case x = y, then I is maximized for ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)h, resulting in an
income I￿jx=y = yh(1 ￿ t) + 1
2￿tyh
4. In case ￿ = h, then I is maximized for x = (1 ￿ ￿)y, resulting in the
same income as un the previous case.
Thus, the income when there is total compliance in one dimension is
I￿
fc = I￿jx=y = I￿j￿=h. It is straightforward to show that I￿ > I￿
fc.
So, the analysis at the boundaries shows that (x￿;￿￿) is indeed the global
maximum point.
7.1.2 Equilibrium with a minimum hourly wage
Given an hourly minimum wage ￿ w, problem (19) becomes:
32max
x2f0g[[ ￿ w;y];￿2[0;h]















Parallel to the main model, workers are split in three categories:
1. High productivity: yi > ￿ w
2 p
(1￿2￿) una⁄ected
2. Intermediate productivity: ￿ w ￿ yi ￿ ￿ w
2 p
(1￿2￿) can choose whether to
increase or decrease their compliance with wage regulation.
3. Low productivity: yi < ￿ w
High productivity workers are una⁄ected by the introduction of the mini-
mum wage as they would have declared higher hourly earnings anyway. Low
productivity workers are expelled from the formal labour market and can
choose black market activity or inactivity. The choice is made by comparing
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4￿




As in the main model, if enforcement is very e⁄ective (low ￿) then the
minimum wage has an e¢ ciency cost as workers with positive productivity
withdraw into idleness. If enforcement is instead not too e⁄ective workers
with hourly productivity below the minimum wage work completely under-
ground.
In what follows we analyze the behaviour of workers with intermediate
productivity.
Declaring the minimum wage When x = ￿ w the amount of declared
hours maximizing income is given by ￿mw =
2y ￿ w
y2+ ￿ w2(1￿￿)h , giving an income:
I
￿
mw = yh ￿
th









2 + ￿ w
2)
2 ￿ (2y ￿ w)
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2￿
Being underground A worker ￿rm pair can always chose to be com-
pletely in the informal economy i.e. x = ￿ = 0. We have seen that this the
best that can be done when there is full evasion in at least one dimension.
Income in case of full evasion is given by (21).
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bm , yi >
1
2 p
[4(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 1]
￿ w = ymw
As the minimum wage constraint is binding only if yi < ￿ w
2 p
(1￿2￿) and
ymw < ￿ w
2 p
(1￿2￿)8￿ < 1
2, then there is always a productivity interval where
workers prefer to increase their compliance to the minimum wage that to
decrease it by declaring zero.
To complete the analysis we should also analyze the remaining bound-
aries.






fc for workers whose productiv-
ity is such that they are a⁄ected by the minimum wage. In case ￿ = h the
maximum income that can be achieved is for sure less than I￿
fc and thus less
than I￿
mw and I￿
bm. Thus, the choice faced by this type of workers is indeed
between increasing compliance to the minimum wage level or decreasing it
to zero.
In this section the model has been extended by allowing hours of work
to be underreported, subject to the same detection technology as earnings.
Also in this case the introduction of the minimum wage induces some work-
ers to increase compliance, producing a spike at the minimum wage level.
Proposition 2 is thus robust to this extention. As the minimum wage acts as
an e⁄ective constraint for the low-productivity part of the workforce, Propo-
sition 3 and Proposition 4 extend to this more general setting.
7.2 Alternative structures of the labour market
The model assumes a speci￿c structure of the labour market, where the
equilibrium distribution of wages with and without the minimum wage is
easily characterized as a worker￿ s earnings are independent of other work-
ers￿earnings. The mechanism presented is however more general. As far
as workers maximize net income, ￿rms maximize expected pro￿ts, and the
product generated by a ￿rm-worker pair is independent from the reporting
34decision, then there is an incentive to minimize the expected total payment
(taxes plus expected ￿nes) to tax authorities.
The tax system introduces a wedge between net take-home pay to the
worker and labour cost for the ￿rm and the decision on how much to report
aims at minimizing such wedge, irrespectively of how savings from tax evasion
are then distributed. Thus, the mechanism proposed can be extended to
other models of the labour market. In some models of the labour market
the problem can be most naturally framed as minimization of expected total
labour cost given a net wage; in other models, like in the one developed here,
as a maximization of net wage given expected total labour cost; in still other
models, like the ones with bargaining, as the maximization of surplus net of
payments to the ￿scal authorities.
Ignoring general equilibrium e⁄ects on the distribution of wages, the in-
troduction of the minimum wage poses a binding constraint for whose ￿rms
that would have reported a lower wage in its absence. Given the trade-o⁄
beneath the reporting decision, it is likely that a mass point at the mini-
mum wage level will emerge in the distribution of declared earnings due to
the interaction between underreporting and minimum wage alone and that
the minimum wage, by restricting the choice set of worker-￿m pairs, make
the government better o⁄, i.e. increases revenues. However, in models of
endogenous wage dispersion like Burdett and Mortensen (1998) or Bhaskar
and To (2003), where a worker￿ s wage depends on other workers￿wages, the
general equilibrium e⁄ects of the introduction of a minimum wage make the
analysis more complex.
7.3 The black economy
The model presents no discontinuity when a ￿rm-agent pair leaves the formal
economy and goes completely underground. It may however be argued that
being completely in the black economy is substantially di⁄erent than being
part of the o¢ cial economy. In particular, we analyze the implication of
possible discontinuities in two key variables: productivity and expected ￿nes.
In the analysis we assume that enforcement parameters are such that there
is underreporting.
357.3.1 Productivity discontinuity
While it seems unlikely that the product generated by a ￿rm-worker pair is
dependent on the reporting behavior in case of simple underreporting, it is
more plausible that entering completely into the black economy may have an
e⁄ect. More di¢ cult access to the legal protection system to enforce contracts
and property rights, inability to tap formal credit, restricted possibility to
advertise, no access to support programs (like training schemes, subsidies to
R&D) for enterprises are some of the factors that may cause a decrease in
the surplus once a ￿rm goes underground. On the other side, the avoidance
of o¢ cial regulation and red tape may boost the product of ￿rms fully in
the underground economy (see Loayza, 1996, for a review). The relative
relevance of the pros and cons depends on the speci￿c situation of a country.
For instance, an ine⁄ective court system and a credit market that is not
accessible for some types of enterprises (like SME) even if registered may
decrease the disadvantage of being underground.
To extend the model to take into account this potential discontinuity is
straightforward. Assume that productivity is:
￿
yi if xi > 0
yi + d if xi = 0 or
￿
yi if xi > 0
￿yi if xi = 0
In case d < 0 or ￿ < 1 the cons of being in the black market outweight
the pros. When there is no minimum wage nothing changes. When there
is a minimum wage ￿ w, then worker-￿rm pair have a greater incentive to
increase compliance to the minimum wage level, instead of going into the
black market, thus reiforcing the tendency to show a spike at the minimum
wage level.
In case d > 0 or ￿ > 1 (and ￿ > t
2), being in the black market provides an
advantage compared to being in the o¢ cial economy. In case of an addictive
productivity di⁄erence, when there is no minimum wage worker-￿rm pairs
characterized by low productivity, i.e. with yi < d
(2￿￿t)
(1￿￿)2, will go into the
black market, for higher productivity pairs instead nothing changes. When
there is a minimum wage, a positive productivity advantage of being in the
black market reduces the incentive for ￿rms to declare the minimum wage
level instead of going into the black economy, but as far as the minimum
wage is high enough compared to the productivity di⁄erential, in particular
36for ￿ w
d > 2￿￿t
t(1￿￿), then there is still a spike at the minimum wage level. In case
the productivity di⁄erence is multiplicative, for the no minimum wage case,
a productivity advantage low enough, i.e. ￿ < 1 +
t(1￿￿)2
2￿￿t , is necessary to
avoid that all agents go into the black market. In such circumstances, the
incentives to declare the minimum wage are reduced, but do not dissapear.
In particular, a spike at the minimum wage level will anyway be present.
7.3.2 Discontinuity in expected ￿nes
A discontinuity at zero declaration may also exist with regard to the expected
￿ne. Again, it is not a priori obvious in which direction such a discontinuity
may work. On one side, the non-existence of a company in o¢ cial registers
may make more di¢ cult to localize it and perform an audit. On the other
side, once an audit is performed, to prove underreporting is much more di¢ -
cult than proving non-reporting, as in the latter case the operation of a ￿rm
without registration constitutes evidence in itself. Discontinuities may also
exist in the ￿ne applied in case of detection, with complete underreporting
likely to be punished more harshly than partial underreporting. Assume that
the expected ￿ne is:
￿
￿f if xi > 0
￿￿f if xi = 0 where f is given by (1)
In case ￿ > 1 being in the black market gives rise to higher expected
￿nes due to higher probability of auditing or higher ￿nes imposed in case
of detection. Without minimum wage, nothing changes. With a minimum
wage, the incentive to declare the minimum are stronger.
In case ￿ 2 (0;1) being in the black market gives rise to lower expected
￿nes due to lower probability of auditing. Unless the advantage of being in
the black market is not too high, every agent goes underground. In particular
for ￿ > (2 ￿ ￿)￿ the equilibrium without minimum wage will not change,
while in case of minimum wage, the incentives to declare the minimum wage
instead of going into the black economy are reduced, but do not dissapear,
with a spike at the minimum wage level remaining.
7.4 Entitlements from social security
Social security contributions usually provides entitlements in the form of
pensions, unemployment bene￿ts, health insurance, maternity bene￿ts and
37so on. If workers value such entitlements, then their existence represents an
incentive to contribute and should be taken into account when analyzing the
evasion decision. Entitlements are usually partly linked to contributions and
partly independent of them. Below, the implications for the model for each
case are analyzed.
7.4.1 Proportional transfers
Suppose that workers receive from social security institutions a transfer pro-
portional to their declared wage, #x. In theory the value for workers of this
could be more than its cost, i.e. # > t. This may be the case when social
security funds run a de￿cit or are subsidized by the general budget (and thus
by ￿scal imposition on a di⁄erent tax base) or when workers highly value
these transfers (for instance because they provide some insurance, that, due
to some market failure, cannot be purchased separately.) In this case, how-
ever, there is no reason to evade taxes, so we assume, more realistically, that
# < t.
Equation (5) becomes:
I = w ￿ tx + #x
In case also equation (1) is modi￿ed, so that ￿nes are paid only on the
amount of evasion net of foregone bene￿ts, then the model is simply modi￿ed
by substituting (t￿#) to t. In case ￿nes continue to be paid on evaded taxes,
then, the solution to (8) becomes:




Not surprisingly, evasion declines, while a positive correlation between
the tax rate and the portion of income that is evaded appears. This is
consistent with the results reported by Alm et al. (1990) in their study
about Jamaican employees tax evasion and avoidance. They ￿nd that "the
tax base rises with higher bene￿t for payroll tax contributions and falls with
higher marginal tax rates", albeit estimated elasticities are small. As for the
e⁄ects of the minimum wage, the productivity threshold above which workers
prefer to declare the minimum wage is lower in case of transfers proportional
to contributions, thus possibly increasing the size of the spike.
387.4.2 Lump-sum transfers
Here the case of a lump-sum transfer ￿ is analyzed. The transfer is assumed to
be conditional on formal working status. In absence of a minimum wage, the
only e⁄ect of a lump-sum transfer is to displace complete evasion emerging
when enforcement is weak with a minimal declaration, as to qualify for the
transfer by being formally part of the workforce. More interestingly, in case
of minimum wage, a transfer conditional on formal working status represents
a further incentive to declare the minimum instead of going into the black
market and thus reduces the productivity threshold above which workers
prefers to declare the minimum wage. In particular the threshold becomes:
ymw =
1
2(1 ￿ ￿) + 2￿ ￿
t ￿ w
￿ w
The lump-sum transfer ￿ should be intended as the di⁄erence between
transfers conditional on being employed and transfers conditional on being
not employed (unemployment bene￿ts or other forms of social support.) In
case ￿ < 0 then the threshold would be higher as being formally employed
would mean giving up some net transfer, but the e⁄ects of the minimum wage
will not disapper as far as the monetary loss in case of o¢ cial employment







The paper develops a tractable model of underreporting of earnings by em-
ployed labour and works out the implications of introducing minimum wage
regulation in such an environment.
The interaction between tax evasion and minimum wage gives rise to a
spike at the minimum wage level. This is a mechanism that has never been
proposed in the literature, that works in a perfectly competitive labour mar-
ket and that can account for the double digit spike present in some countries.
In addition the model contributes to the policy discussion on minimum
wage in countries where underreporting of earnings is a relevant phenomenon.
In particular it is shown that the introduction of the minimum wage can
indeed boost ￿scal revenues by extracting more resources from the lower end
of the productivity distribution.
39The model makes a new prediction about the correlation between the size
of the spike at the minimum wage level and the size of the informal economy
that ￿nds support in the data.
The paper also contributes to the literature on tax evasion by showing
that imperfect detection alone is able to generate an internal solution to
the tax evasion decision, even with ￿xed probability of an audit and risk
neutrality by the agent subject to it.
In Tonin (2006) an empirical investigation is conducted on the e⁄ects on
disposable income of increasing the minimum wage implied by the model.
The optimal auditing strategy in case of imperfect detection and the
optimal minimum wage in a labour market structure where the minimum
wage has a role beyond its ￿scal impact are the subjects of future research.
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42Appendix A
An alternative setting for imperfect detection
Tax authority devotes an exogenously given ￿ ￿ 0 units of "auditing re-
sources" to every ￿rm-worker pair. The more resources are used, the more
income is discovered in expectations. In particular, if ￿ unit of resources are
used, then discovered income ^ y is distributed with uniform probability in the
interval [(1 ￿ a￿￿)y;y] where a > 1 measures the e⁄ectiveness of auditing.
￿ if ￿ = 0 (no resources) the interval is [0;y] (even with no resources
there is the possibility of discovering - may be interpreted as emergence
of evidence from other investigations or receiving denunciation or other
costless way of getting evidence)
￿ if ￿ ! +1 the (degenerated) interval is [y;y] = fyg i.e. the full income
is discovered for sure






y ^ y 2 [(1 ￿ a￿￿)y;y]
0 otherwise
Provided the tax authority devotes resources ￿ to a taxpayer characterized
by true income y and declared income x then the expected ￿ne is:
f =
8
> > > > > > <




(^ y ￿ x)g(^ y)d^ y if x ￿ (1 ￿ a￿￿)y
[(1 ￿ a￿￿)y ￿ x]t￿ + t￿
y Z
x
(^ y ￿ x)g(^ y)d^ y if x < (1 ￿ a￿￿)y
as the part of undeclared income below (1 ￿ a￿￿)y is discovered with
certainty and a ￿ne is imposed on it, then it will never be the case that
x < (1 ￿ a￿￿)y , provided the taxpayer knows the detection technology and
￿.




















that is equivalent to (7), where the probability of an auditing being per-
formed ￿ 2 [0;1] is substituted by the coe¢ cient a￿ ￿ 0, where ￿ is the
amount of resources devoted to auditing and a indicated how fast the amount
of discovered income increases with auditing e⁄ort.
Audit conditional on report x
Probability of performing an audit can be conditioned on declared income x,
so ￿ = ￿(x)
Proposition 6 As far as ￿￿ < +1 it is impossible to induce any taxpayer
to fully comply.
Proof. Given an income y and a probability of audit ￿(x) 2 [0;1] a taxpayer
prefers to declare y , i.e. to fully comply, than declaring x 2 [0;y) i⁄
(1 ￿ t)y ￿ y ￿ xt ￿ ￿(x)t￿ 1
y
1






x;y = limx!y￿ ￿￿
x;y = +1 then as far as ￿￿ < +1 there
is a neighborhood of y at which the above condition cannot hold and thus
taxpayers prefer to declare x < y than y.
In the alternative setting proposed in this appendix the equivalent condi-
tion not to have full compliance even in case of devoted "auditing resources"
conditional on declared income is ￿￿(x)￿ < +1.
The above proposition implies that whatever auditing policy is imple-
mented, at any income level there will be some evasion. So, for any auditing
policy there is room for the minimum wage to exert its in￿ uence. However,
a ￿xed cost for the taxpayer of being subject to an audit, together with a
higher probability of being audited in case of non-compliance than in case of
full compliance, would undo the result.
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1999/2000 2001/02 2002/03 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bulgaria 36.9 37.1 38.3 : : : 5.1 :
Czech
Republic 19.1 19.6 20.1 : 1.6 1.7 2 2
Estonia 38.4 39.2 40.1 : 6.5 7.4 6.94 6.4
Hungary 25.1 25.7 26.2 : 3.88 8.43 11.38 8.1
Latvia 39.9 40.7 41.3 : 13.89 16.71 15.36 13.63
Lithuania 30.3 31.4 32.6 : 8.2 7.8 8.8 10.15
Poland 27.6 28.2 28.9 : : 2.89 3.96 :
Romania 34.4 36.1 37.4 : 6.5 6.1 8.9 12.2
Slovakia 18.9 19.3 20.2 : : 0.22 0.1 0.41
Slovenia 27.1 28.3 29.4 : 2 2.6 2.6 2.7
Netherlands 13.1 13.0 12.6 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.28 2.24
Portugal 22.7 22.5 21.9 7.5 6.2 4 4 5.69
France
1,2 15.2 15.0 14.5 12.8 13.6 13.9 14 13.4
Ireland
1 15.9 15.7 15.3 13.7 : 2.2 2.1 3.1
Spain
2 22.7 22.5 22.0 2.6 1.4 0.85 0.78 0.86
United
Kingdom
1,3 12.7 12.5 12.2 2.5 1.4 1 1.8 1.2
United
States
1,3 8.7 8.7 8.4 2.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.4
1: minimum wage is fixed on an hourly base;
Informal economy as % of official
GDP
Proportion of full-time employees with earnings on the
minimum wage (%)
Source: Schneider (2005) Source: Eurostat (2004)
3: earnings at or below the minimum wage;
2: part-time workers included in the data on earnings;
The relative size of the shadow economy is estimated by Schneider (2005)
using a DYMIMIC (Dynamic Multiple Indicator, Multiple Causes) approach,
where the size of the hidden economy is a latent variable. For transition
countries cause variables used in the structural model are: share of direct
taxation, share of indirect taxation (both in % of GDP); share of public ad-
ministrative employment in % of total employment as a proxy for burden
of state regulation or state interference; unemployment rate and GDP per
capita. For highly developed OECD countries additional cause variables used
are the burden of social security payments, the tax morale, quality of state
institutions and an index of the regulation of the labor market. Employ-
ment rate (% of the population between 18 and 64), annual growth rate of
GDP, and annual growth rate of local currency per capita are used as indi-
cator variables in the measurement model. The absolute size of the shadow
economy is calculated combining the estimates for the relative size obtained
through the above mentioned method with available estimates for the size of
the informal economy obtained through a currency demand approach and
available for some countries. For details on the method see Schneider (2005).
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